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COMMENT
THE JUVENILE OFFENDER AND SELF-INCRIMINATION
A juvenile offender whose case has been transferred from juvenile
court to criminal court may be confronted with incriminating statements which he made during the course of the juvenile proceedings.
The admissibility in a criminal prosecution of confessions and admissions made by a juvenile to police, probation officers, juvenile court
judges, or other juvenile authorities involves important issues of
public policy and constitutional law.
The problem typically arises when a youth of sixteen or seventeen
commits an act which, were he an adult, would be characterized as
a crime. The youth has a history of several juvenile offenses. He is
arrested and quickly confesses.' Why not? The police "know" he
did it; lying or refusing to answer questions will only aggravate the
situation. If he cooperates, he may receive better treatment from
the judge. He also cooperates with the juvenile probation officer who
interrogates him, because he knows that the probation officer will
make recommendations to the juvenile court judge regarding treatment. Despite the youth's cooperation with the authorities, the
juvenile court judge decides to transfer the case to criminal court.
The youth is then confronted by the prosecutor and is advised to
plead guilty; conviction is a foregone conclusion, because the prosecutor has the youth's own confession and admissions to use against him.
The youth is unaware that serious questions of constitutional law
have arisen from this turn of events, but he probably is bitterly
aware that the cooperative behavior required to win leniency in
juvenile court has paradoxically damned him to almost certain conviction in criminal court.'
1 See generally, Long, Headaches of a Judge-A Challenge to the Bar, 27 WASH.
L. REv. 130, 135 (1952). "Most kids, when confronted by the police, not only confess
to the matter at issue, but will voluntarily involve themselves and others in offenses
the officers had not even heard of. They may start out with a lie, but... they can't
stick with the lie very long, and so they usually 'shoot the works,' and 'sing."'
2 How many juveniles this has happened to is not known. There are no appellate
decisions on this subject in Washington. The Seattle-King County Bar Association's
manual, JuvENr
COURT PRAcTIcE IN KING COUNTY (1964) states, at 15, that "counsel
may wish to advise a youth of 16 years or over who has a previous record... and on
whom the juvenile court may waive jurisdiction for adult prosecution.., to make no
disclosure or admission except through counsel until the decision as to jurisdiction
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Since the problem originates in the juvenile proceeding, an examination of an individual's rights in those proceedings is in order.
Judicial recognition of an accused's rights in juvenile proceedings has
been haphazard at best with many courts loath to give them more
than lip service. The reason is that a juvenile proceeding is considered
to be a special, non-criminal proceeding, designed to accomplish both
the protection of young people and the prevention of criminal development rather than the administration of criminal punishment. This has
led to a rather curious development-a juvenile offender suffers from
greater disabilities than his adult counterpart. For instance, in Washington, good faith is a defense to false imprisonment of a juvenile
because the restraint is imposed by the state as a parent for the
protection and well being of the child.3 Similarly, article I, section
22 of the Washington Constitution guarantees bail in all criminal
proceedings, but a juvenile has no right to bail because a juvenile
proceeding is not considered to be criminal.' Finally, since he is not
being subjected to a criminal prosecution, a juvenile can be forced
to incriminate himself, even though he faces a possible deprivation
of liberty.5
However, some courts have had second thoughts about due process
in juvenile proceedings. In California, where juvenile courts were
once allowed to compel self-incrimination because the proceeding was
"non-criminal," 6 statutory characterization of the proceeding as noncriminal is now deemed to be "a legal fiction, presenting a challenge
to credulity and doing violence to reason." 7 Detrimental effects upon
the juvenile, i.e., deprivation of liberty, employment difficulties, rehas been made...." This appears to be a clear indication from experienced counsel

that the prosecutor will use self-incriminatory statements made in the course of

juvenile proceedings.

The Children's Bureau Publication No. 346, STANDARDs

FOR

(1954), suggests, at 38-39, that the
use of evidence obtained in juvenile proceedings, including admissions made in preliminary investigations, be prohibited in subsequent criminal proceedings if jurisdiction
is transferred. Wigmore lists thirty-eight states which expressly prevent the admission
in criminal court of evidence obtained in the course of a juvenile proceeding. 1
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 196(c) n. 5 (3rd ed. 1940). Washington is not among them.
3 Weber v. Doust, 84 Wash. 330, 146 Pac. 623 (1915).
4 State ex rel. Gray v. Webster, 122 Wash. 526, 211 Pac. 274 (1922).
5In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954) ; cited with approval in In re
Lewis, 51 Wn.2d 193, 316 P.2d 907 (1957). Accord, I); re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205,
183 P.2d 282 (1947) ; In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); People
v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932). The extent of the impositions on
civil liberties approved at one time or another for juvenile court proceedings exceeds
the bounds of this comment, and these examples are recited here primarily to give
the flavor of the topic. See Antieau, ConstitutionalRights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORN.
L.6Q. 387 (1961).
Inre Dargo, supra note 5.
In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App.2d 691, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952).
SPECIALIZED COURTS DEALING WITH CHILDREN
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strictions on military service, and not the form of the proceeding, are
considered controlling. In Washington, D. C., Judge Holtzoff stated:
precious constitutional rights cannot be diminishedt or whittled away
by the device of changing names of tribunals or modifying the nomenclature of legal proceedings. The test must be the nature and essence of
be the loss of
the proceeding rather than its title. If the result may
personal liberty, the constitutional safeguards apply.3
In the state of Washington, applicability of constitutional safeguards to juvenile proceedings is confused. In In re Lewis,' where
the right to a public trial was unsuccessfully asserted, the court
indicated, in dictum, that a juvenile could be compelled to incriminate
himself, because the proceeding was remedial and not penal. But in
In re Petrie," the court held that before the juvenile court could effect
a permanent termination of the relationship between a natural parent
and her child, due process required that the parent be afforded
reasonable notice; an opportunity to be heard or defend; the assistance of counsel, if wanted; a reasonable time to prepare for trial;
and an orderly proceeding. In In re Lundy,1 in determining whether
a seventeen-year-old could be prohibited from singing in a bar and
grill, the court prefaced its decision by remarking that while the
juvenile court act was to be interpreted liberally to effect its beneficent
purposes, nevertheless it had to be "construed with all the strictness
of a criminal law..." so that "no person, whether minor or adult,
should ever be restrained of liberty without due process.... 2
The problem in many states has been that due process requirements have not been evenly applied to juvenile proceedings. Their
application has been limited to the forum's view of the safeguards
necessary to its concept of special proceedings for juvenile offenders.
Weber v. Doust 3 is a good example. In an action for false imprisonment brought by a juvenile who had been detained in violation of
law, the court held that the officers were liable on the theory that,
despite the special nature of the juvenile proceeding, not even a
delinquent child could be deprived of his liberty without due process.
However, on rehearing, the earlier decision was reversed. The court
8
United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D.D.C. 1958), rezvd o other
grounds, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C.Cir. 1959).
9 51 Wn.2d 193, 316 P.2d 907 (1957).
2040 Wn.2d 809, 246 P2d 465 (1952).
11 82 Wash. 148, 143 Pac. 885 (1914).
121d. at 151, 143 Pac. at 886.
12 Weber v. Doust, 81 Wash. 668, 143 Pac. 148 (1914), rev'd on rehearing, 84 Wash.
330, 146 Pac. 623 (1915).
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reasoned that, because of the special nature of a juvenile proceeding,
a good-faith arrest made for the protection and well-being of the child
was not a denial of due process. Just how due process became an
issue in a false imprisonment action is never revealed, and does not
ever appear to be involved, since the holding is merely that good
faith is a defense to a juvenile's suit for false imprisonment. This
case illustrates the confusion and uncertainty in this area of the law.
Despite this confusion, the need for fundamental fairness and due
process in juvenile proceedings, coupled with a series of recent decisions
relating to self-incrimination and the right to counsel, leads to the
conclusion that self-incriminatory statements made in the course of
a juvenile proceeding (including out-of-court proceedings) will not
generally be admissible in criminal proceedings where the juvenile
court waives jurisdiction and transfers the case to criminal court.
Considerations of Public Policy. The purpose of special proceedings for juveniles is not to punish or restrain an individual but rather
to inquire into his welfare and prevent the development of a criminal."
It is not surprising that some courts have found that a child "questioned in the same manner and spirit as a parent might have questioned his child was not 'compelled' to give a self-incriminating
answer to a question."'" It is, after all, essential that the juvenile
court know precisely what the child has done, and the circumstances
of his life generally, if it is to make a proper diagnosis of the child's
problem and arrive at a feasible plan for his protection, guidance,
or rehabilitation." Thus, despite obvious unfairness in forcing a
juvenile to incriminate himself when he faces detention (a probable
violation of due process), it can be assumed that, because of the
special nature of the juvenile proceeding, courts will continue to
permit this compelled self-incrimination.
On the other hand, if the juvenile's case is transferred to a criminal
court, the rationale of obtaining self-incriminating statements is no
longer relevant. In the criminal setting there is little inquiry into the
child's welfare. No longer is society interested in preventing the making of a criminal; one allegedly exists. Society is going to restrain and
punish the offender, not protect, guide, or rehabilitate him. Having
gently questioned the child "in the same manner and spirit as a
14 In re Lewis, 51 Wn.2d 193, 316 P.2d 907 (1957) ; accord, Weber v. Doust, supra
note 13; In re Lundy, 82 Wash. 148, 143 Pac. 885 (1914). Juvenile offenders and
readers of the press are probably of the opinion that the juvenile court often punishes.
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parent might have questioned his child," society now drops the
parental mask and turns him over to the prosecutor, with an iron-clad
case built on the juvenile's own confession and admissions.
Juvenile codes generally prescribe that juvenile proceedings shall
not be open to the public and that the probation officer's investigation
These laws are
record shall be withheld from public inspection
intended to protect a juvenile offender from public calumny and also
to encourage a complete, uninhibited disclosure of the juvenile's past.
Their purpose and effect is vitiated when self-incriminatory statements are allowed to be made public after a transfer of a juvenile
case to criminal court.18 It would appear to be more consistent with
the purpose of juvenile court acts if incriminatory statements made
by a juvenile prior to transfer to criminal court were considered
privileged. The rationale for compelling such statements rests on the
remedial nature of a juvenile proceeding. If the prosecutor is allowed
to use these statements against the juvenile in a subsequent criminal
prosecution, the remedial juvenile proceeding is converted into a
preliminary proceeding in the criminal process. 9
Considerations of Due Process. The scope of due process in
the context of juvenile proceedings has been uncertain; it has varied
according to time, forum, and the particular safeguard being asserted.
For instance, no case holds that a juvenile cannot insist upon a fair
hearing; jurisdictions vary as to whether he has a privilege against
self-incrimination,"0 and no case has been found in which the juvenile
could insist upon a public trial. But in recent years, a series of
decisions has led to a minority rule, which one court stated as follows:
25 Itsre Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523, 526 (1954).
The same information should be available to the criminal courts for precisely the
same reason. It does not necessarily follow that the defendants should be compelled
to testify against themselves.
17 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.04.091 and 13.04.230.
isThis is not to imply that the Washington statutes necessarily preclude the use
of such evidence in a criminal trial. Their language, while perhaps indicating a
privilege, State v. Bixby, 27 Wn.2d 144, 177 P.2d 689 (1947), does not approximate
that of the statutes in other states which have been interpreted as proscribing the
supra note 2.
use of such admissions in criminal court. 1 WIGMORE, op. cit.
19 While there is no Washington precedent, there are cases concerning the trial
of juveniles in criminal court, none of which reveals the slightest judicial misgivings
about the possible use of statements made in the course of juvenile proceedings. State
v. Ring, 54 Wn.2d 250, 339 P.2d 461 (1959) (tried in criminal court after defendant
turned eighteen years of age) ; State v. Melvin, 144 Wash. 687, 258 Pac. 859 (1927);
79 (1919).
State
2 0 ex. rel. Sowders v. Superior Court, 105 Wash. 684, 179 Pac.
Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944) (privilege exists); In re
Sadlier, 97 Utah 17, 85 P.2d 810, aff'd on rehearing,97 Utah 313, 94 P2d 161 (1939) ;
In re Tahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 Pac. 804 (1920); See cases cited note 5, supra
(privilege does not exist).
28
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[W] here the charge in the Juvenile Court is one of crime which, because
of charitable considerations for the welfare of the child, is called
by the guarantees
"juvenile delinquency," then it must be surrounded
2
and limitations of the federal constitution. '
The reason is that whether the proceeding be called "civil," "equitable," or "criminal,"
the constitutional limitations are applicable if the final action of the
court may result in depriving a person of his liberty. Whether the
enforced incarceration may be in jail, penitentiary, reformatory, training school, or other institution,
is immaterial. What matters is the
22
potential loss of liberty.
The most recent case adopting the view that constitutional safeguards apply to juvenile proceedings is United States v. Morales.23
The court in this case concluded that the variation in rulings concerning the applicability of constitutional safeguards is attributable to
the variation in the proceedings; ie., some are social and do not affect
the juvenile's liberty, while others are directed toward depriving the
juvenile of his liberty. In the latter proceedings, basic constitutional
safeguards must be observed. The cases, however, do not divide
along these lines. For instance, in In re Holmes,2 a juvenile faced a
deprivation of liberty, nevertheless, he was forced to incriminate himself. However, the conclusion of the court in Morales that this variation in juvenile proceedings is the only proper ground for the denial of
constitutional safeguards in any juvenile proceeding appears to be
sound. It is probable, therefore, that more and more courts will
adopt the rule that where a juvenile faces a possible deprivation of
liberty, due process requirements apply.
An established theory holds that because the proceedings in juvenile
court do not constitute "criminal" proceedings, the juvenile may,
therefore, be compelled by that court to testify.25 The fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination applies only to protect
21 In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D.D.C. 1955).
22 United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 901 (D.D.C. 1958). The Washington court in In re Lundy, 82 Wash. 148, 143 Pac. 885 (1914), also rested the right
to due process on the existence of a threat to liberty. Each of the following cases
held that regardless of the special, non-criminal nature of a juvenile proceeding, due
process applies if liberty is in peril: Shioutkan v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666
(D.C. Cir. 1956); United States v. Morales, 233 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mont. 1964);
Application of Johnson, 178 F. Supp. 155 (D.N.J. 1957); In re Contreras, 109 Cal.
App.2d 691, 241 P.2d 631 (1952).
23 233 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mont. 1964).
24379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
25

379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
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against criminal prosecution, and a juvenile proceeding is not a criminal prosecution. This argument, however, is valid only where no
danger of criminal prosecution exists when the juvenile is being compelled to testify in juvenile court. There can be no question that such
a danger does exist." In In re Holmes, 7 the Pennsylvania court held
that the juvenile court's compelling a juvenile to testify was not a
constitutionally proscribed compulsion of self-incrimination. The basis
for the court's decision was its view that the proceeding was noncriminal, designed not to punish but rather to protect. However,
noting that a juvenile could be transferred to criminal court for trial,
the court stated that such a transfer "could not be made after the
Juvenile Court had made an adjudication of delinquency nor, perhaps,
after any self-incriminatory examination of the child." 2
In Harling v. United States, " a unanimous court held that oral

admissions made by a juvenile while in police custody prior to the
juvenile court's waiving jurisdiction are inadmissible in subsequent
criminal proceedings." The court reasoned that compelled selfincrimination was possible in the juvenile court only because the
juvenile was immune from criminal prosecution. 3 If the action were
criminal, the constitutional prohibition would necessarily apply. To
use admissions obtained in juvenile court to prosecute in criminal
court after a waiver of jurisdiction would violate "fundamental notions
of fairness," and turn the juvenile proceeding into "an adjunct to
and part of the adult criminal process." 2 By resorting to the concept
of fundamental fairness, the court avoided the self-incrimination
question. 8
Until recently, federal constitutional standards did not apply to
state proceedings because the privilege against self-incrimination was
not considered a part of due process. Each state was free to apply
2

6 WAssH. REV. CoDE § 13.04.120 (juvenile may be transferred to criminal court for
prosecution) ; State v. Melvin, 144 Wash. 687, 258 Pac. 859 (1927) ; State ex rel.
Sowders v. Superior Court, 105 Wash. 684, 179 Pac. 79 (1919).
27379 Pa. 599, 109 A2d 523 (1954).
2B1d. at 526; accord, Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W2d 269 (1944),
and In re Sadlier, 97 Utah 17, 85 P.2d 810, aff'd on rehearing, 97 Utah 313, 94 P.2d
161 (1939).
29295 F2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
30 The court specifically did not rest its decision on the McNabb-Mallory rule which
provides that statements made by an accused after detention, with an unreasonable
delay obtaining before the accused is brought before a magistrate, are not admissible.
81295 F. 2d at 163.
32 Id. at 164.
*3The court was not called upon to determine whether due process considerations
would bar the use of the juvenile's admissions in juvenile court. Presumably there
was no objection to their use in that forum.
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its own standards in determining whether its own privilege against
self-incrimination precluded the use of testimony compelled in a
juvenile proceeding in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Two landmark decisions handed down in 1964 by the United States Supreme
Court have changed this situation completely.
In Malloy v. Hogan,"' the Court held that the privilege against
self-incrimination is a part of due process under the fourteenth
amendment and applies to the states in the same manner and to the
same extent as it applies to the federal government. In the companion
3 5 the
case of Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor,
Court, overruling prior contrary decisions, held that where a state
compels self-incrimination through the use of a grant of immunity,
the federal government is prohibited from making use of the testimony to convict the person who was compelled to testify. The Court
rejected any notion that the rule rested on its control over the federal
judiciary, basing its decision squarely on constitutional grounds. In
view of the rule announced in Malloy, there can be no question that
the Murphy rule will also apply to the states.3
In regard to juvenile offenders, the conclusive effect of Malloy and
Murphy is obvious. Prior to Malloy, the privilege against selfincrimination was not a part of due process. Each state applied the
privilege, by its own, not federal, standards. Now, however, federal
standards apply. Prior to Murphy, there was no federal constitutional
standard which prevented "whipsawing" a suspect by compelling his
testimony in one jurisdiction under a grant of immunity and then trying
him in another jurisdiction, using the compelled testimony against him.
The use of testimony in juvenile court secured in violation of due
process standards is justified, if ever, only because the juvenile is
deemed to be immune from criminal prosecution. On the strength of
the rule announced in Murphy, it would seem that self-incriminatory
testimony, which is compelled in juvenile court, would not be available
in a criminal prosecution, since this would constitute the proscribed
practice. Indeed, under the Murphy rule, any evidence obtained as a
result of such juvenile court testimony must likewise be excluded in
criminal court."
While the combination of the Malloy and Murphy rules precludes
the prosecutor's use of a juvenile's compelled testimony, the problem
34378 U.S. 1 (1964).
-5 378 U.S. 52 (1964).

36 Id. at 57 n.6.
37Id. at 79 n.18.
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is not completely resolved. Often the juvenile's testimony' is not compelled by the court. It is volunteered in hope of obtaining leniency.
Counsel may protect the juvenile by answering for him or by forcing
the juvenile court to compel the testimony. But juveniles are often
unrepresented by counsel, and the Murphy and Malloy rules do little
to assist a naive, unrepresented juvenile who is anxious to please the
authorities.
Involuntary Confessions and Admissions. The involuntariness of a
confession or admission is an unusual ground for an appeal of an
adjudication of juvenile delinquency, since it is unusual for any confession or admission by a juvenile made to police or juvenile officers to be
"involuntary." The nature of juvenile proceedings and the nature of
youth both operate to result in "voluntary" admissions of the juvenile's
misconduct. Through his knowledge of the juvenile court system and
his experience with parents, friends, and teachers, the juvenile knows
that his hope for leniency lies in being painfully honest and properly
contrite. Failing to realize that the authorities can be certain of his
guilt and still be unable to punish him because of insufficient admissible
evidence in a criminal proceeding (or, for that matter, in a juvenile
proceeding), the juvenile ordinarily "sings" without much encour88
agement.
Because the juvenile or his counsel will usually admit the misconduct
before the juvenile court, there is little likelihood of a challenge to a
confession or admission in the juvenile proceeding. But if the case is
transferred to criminal court, there is no reason why a challenge
cannot then be made. If the confession or admission is challenged as
being involuntary, the state has the burden of proving the contrary.
Considering the impressionable nature of youngsters and the compulsive nature of the juvenile proceeding from arrest through final
disposition, this could be a very difficult burden. 9 Indeed, if a confession "obtained by any direct or implied promises"' ' or "extracted
by any sort of threats" 4 is inadmissible, it may well be that no admission or confession obtained in the course of a juvenile proceeding is
admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Implicit in the juvenile
38 A cogent argument can be made that the very nature of this situation amounts
to coercion and inducement and that all admissions and confessions so obtained bre
involuntary.
8)See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
40 Brai v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897), cited with approval in, Malloy

v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
41 Brain v. United States, supra note 40, at 542.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 40:189

proceeding is an implied promise of leniency for cooperation and an
implied threat of stern punishment for refusing to cooperate.
Advice as to Constitutional Rights. Over the years, an increasing
number of rights have been accorded to accused persons as a part of
due process under the fourteenth amendment, as the individual's position in society has been steadily elevated. For example, a brutal beating was required to exclude a confession in 1936,2 "so mild a whip as
the refusal ... to allow a suspect to call his wife until he confessed," 3
sufficed to exclude an admission of guilt in 1963. Certain of these
rights, i.e. the right to counsel and the right to remain silent, are
effective only if the accused knows of their existence and knows that
he may exercise them.
When the Court held, in Gideon v. Wainwright," that the right to
counsel in all criminal proceedings was a part of due process, the question when the right to counsel attached was left unanswered. However, it was clear that it attached whenever a "critical stage" was
reached." Then, in Escobedo v. Illinois,6 the Court ruled (1) that a
suspect has a right to counsel when suspicion has focused upon him
and he is being interrogated; (2) that statements obtained from such
an interrogation where counsel has been denied are not admissible, and
(3) that he has a right to remain silent which is derived from the
privilege against self-incrimination. Naturally, these rights may be
waived. In Escobedo, because the suspect specifically asked to see his
lawyer, there was no question of waiver. But what of the suspect who
fails to ask for a lawyer? This was precisely the case in two recent
state court decisions. "
In People v. Dorado,"8 the accused freely and voluntarily admitted
a killing and signed a written statement. Relying upon Escobedo, the
California court held that the confession was inadmissible because the
interrogating officer had not advised the accused of his right to remain
silent and of his right to counsel after the investigation focused on him.
The court said that:
the constitutional right to counsel precludes the use of incriminating
42

Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
43 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
44372 U.S. 335 (1963).
45White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52
(1961).
46378 U.S. 478 (1964).
47 People v. Dorado, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 394 P.2d 952 (1964) ; State v. Neely, 395
P.2d 557 (Ore. 1964).
48 People v. Dorado supra note 47.
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statements elicited by the police during an accusatory investigation
unless that right is intelligently waived; that no waiver can be pre-

sumed if the investigating officers do not inform the suspect of his
right to counsel or his right to remain silent. 49

The court found that the cases could not be distinguished merely
because counsel had not been requested. The test, it felt, was substantive-whether or not the stage at which guidance and protection of
counsel became necessary had been reached. At such time, the state
must inform the suspect (1) of his right to counsel, and (2) of his right
to remain silent. By requiring that the suspect know of these rights,
assert them, and know when the critical stage has been reached, too
heavy a burden would be placed upon the very person for whom the
protections are intended. This reasoning finds strong support in the
Escobedo dissent by Mr. Justice White, where the majority opinion is
interpreted as establishing precisely the rule adopted in Dorado." The
attempt in Escobedo to distinguish some earlier, contrary decisionswhere advice as to the accused's right to counsel and right to remain
silent was given, also was given support in Dorado."
In State v. Neely," the accused was taken into custody and questioned for several hours without being informed of his right to remain
silent or of his right to counsel until after he had confessed. The
Oregon court noted that one of the critical facts of Escobedo was missing-the accused in Neely had not asked for counsel, but decided that
it did not need to rule on the right to counsel because of another element, i.e. the failure of the interrogator to advise the suspect of his
right to remain silent. The court pointed out that all the opinions
(majority and dissenting) in Escobedo assumed that the right to
remain silent at a police interrogation was a constitutional right, stemming from the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment5 3
Since the accused cannot be deemed to have waived his right unless he
knew it existed, the state assumes the responsibility to see that a suspect
is effectively warned of his right to remain silent. "[I] f this is not
affirmatively shown by the state, a confession obtained without such
warning is inadmissible.""
The language of Escobedo leaves little doubt that the two state
49 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 268, 394 P2d 952, 956 (1964).
50 378 U.S. at 495.
51 Id.at 491-92.
52 395 P2d 557 (Ore. 1964).
53 See Murphy v. Waterfront Conm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 57 n.6

(1964).

51 395 P2d at 561.
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courts are correct. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Goldberg
stated:
[E]very person accused of a crime... is entitled to a lawyer at trial.
The rule sought by the State here, however, would make the trial no
more than an appeal from the interrogation; and the "right to use
counsel at the formal trial [would be] a very hollow thing [if], for
all practical purposes, the conviction is already assured by pretrial
examination."
It is argued that if the right to counsel is afforded prior to indictment, the number of confessions obtained by the police will diminish
significantly.... This argument, of course, cut two ways. The fact
that many confessions are obtained during the period points up its
critical nature as a "stage when legal aid and advice" are surely
needed.... There is necessarily a direct relationship between the importance of a stage to the police in their quest for a confession and the
criticalness of that stage to the accused in his need for legal advice."
The importance of the Escobedo rule to the subject of juvenile con-

fessions is manifest. Although it might be that the special nature of
the juvenile proceeding will prevent the operation of the rule in that
context, any attempt to use admissions or confessions obtained in those
proceedings in a subsequent criminal prosecution should evoke the
rule and result in their exclusion. Indeed, the less the rule is observed
in juvenile proceedings, the more it will affect any subsequent criminal
proceedings.
As both Doradoand Neeley point out, the burden is on the state not
only to show that the necessary advice has been given the suspect but
also that a competent and intelligent waiver has been made. In regard
to juveniles, it may be that such a waiver is impossible as a matter of
law. A minor is considered legally incompetent to bind himself in a
vast array of legal relationships, and the force behind this policy of
legal incompetence would certainly seem to be applicable in a criminal
proceeding. A minor cannot, for instance, appear in a civil action without a guardian ad litem because he is deemed, as a matter of law, to be
incapable of protecting his legal interests. It seems odd, indeed, that
he should be considered incompetent to prejudice his rights in a civil
action but competent to do so in a criminal prosecution. However, in
Williams v. Huff, 8 this view was rejected and a finding required
whether, as a matter of fact, a competent waiver had been made. In
55 378 U.S. at 487-88 (citations omitted).
56 142 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1944).

JUVENILES AND SELF INCRIMINATION

Washington, a different result might be expected. In In re Lundy,"' in
discussing the purpose of the juvenile court act, the court specifically
noted that "in passing it, the legislature indulged the usual presumptions arising from human experience that there is ordinarily a lack of
mature discretion, discriminating judgment, and stability of character
in children under the age of eighteen years ....,I

But even if waiver

by a juvenile is made a question of fact, it would appear to be a rare
case where such a waiver will be found. 9
CONCLUSION

It seems safe to conclude that alert counsel will be able to prevent
the admission in evidence at a criminal trial of most self-incriminatory
statements made by a juvenile in the course of a juvenile proceeding.
It will be a most unusual case where a juvenile's constitutional rights
will not be violated by the use of such evidence. The upshot will be
either a marked decrease in cases transferred from juvenile to criminal
court or a marked increase in the observance of constitutional safeguards by police and juvenile authorities in handling juveniles. The
latter alternative might come about through the present trend toward
observing due process requirements in juvenile proceedings, where
there is a possibility that the juvenile faces a deprivation of liberty.
The problem can be avoided entirely by observing due process in
juvenile court proceedings. The beneficient purpose behind juvenile
court acts is small reason for denying juveniles the minimum standards
of fairness which are called due process. It seems reasonable to propose
that before society imposes its aid upon a juvenile it first prove that he
needs such aid. And it also seems reasonable to suggest that in doing
so, society extend to the juvenile the same constitutional safeguards
that it extends to adults.
RODGER W. PEGuEs

Wash. 148, 143 Pac. 885 (1914).
8Id.at 152, 143 Pac. at 887.

5782

5

5 See note 1, supra and accompanying text and note 38, supra, and accompanying

text. The youth of the accused, his fear of harsh treatment for failure to cooperate,
and the implied promise of leniency for cooperation combine to make a competent
waiver all but impossible.

